The Kyoto Protocol and Global Environmental Strategies of the EU, the U.S. and Japan: A Perspective from Japan by Aiba, Takao & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
The Kyoto Protocol and Global Environmental
Strategies of the EU, the U.S. and Japan: A
Perspective from Japan













The Kyoto Protocol and Global Environmental Strategies of  














* We would like to thank Peter Bohm, Mitsutoshi Hayakawa, Carsten Helm, Yoshie Ishida, 
Naoki Kojima, Mikako Kokitsu, Hiroki Kudo, Takako Nakajima, Hidetaka Nakanishi, 
Hidenori Niizawa, Naoko Nishimura, Ichiro Sadamori, Kanako Tanaka, Akinobu Yasumoto 
and Takehiko Yamato for their helpful comments and discussions. Research was partially 
supported by the Nissan Foundation and the Sumitomo Foundation.  
 
a The Japan Economic Research Institute (JERI), 3-4 Kandasurugadai 3-chome, Chiyoda-ku, 
Tokyo 101-0062, Japan 
b Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan 
c Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, 1-3-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda, Tokyo 
100-8901, Japan 

















   
Despite the objection of the Bush administration to the U.S.’s ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol, its entry into force has come to be realistic due to the Bonn Agreement in July. 
The purpose of this paper is first to survey the framework of the Protocol, and then to 
analyze the strategic positions of the EU, the U.S., and Japan in negotiations for 
designing the details of the Protocol. Finally, this paper intends to consider the due 
strategy of Japan, as well as to identify the problems of the Protocol, which will be a help 
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1. Introduction 
 
Global warming caused by the emissions of green house gases (GHGs) including CO2 is 
accompanied by a double “exploitation.” One is the “exploitation” of future generations by 
generations that have emitted a significant portion of GHGs. GHGs that are being emitted 
now do not contribute to the current global warming immediately. Instead, future 
generations will be affected by a temperature rise caused by accumulated GHGs. The other 
“exploitation” appears within the same generation. Those who live in countries that are 
enjoying rich lifestyles by emitting a substantial amount of GHGs are “exploiting” those 
who live in countries that are not emitting GHGs, by not paying for their GHG emissions. 
Thus, the global warming problem can be considered as a complicated problem regarding 
intra-generational and inter-generational “commons.” 
 
2. The Kyoto Protocol1 
 
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted in 1992 to address global 
warming, and was brought into force in 1994. The third session of the Conference of the 
Parties to UNFCCC (COP3) was held in Kyoto in 1997, where the Kyoto Protocol was 
adopted. The Protocol stipulates that 38 countries, including developed countries and 
economies in transition, will reduce their GHGs including CO2 respectively to total 
emissions 5.2% below the 1990 level during a period from 2008 to 2012. For example, 
reduction below 1990 levels of 8% is required for the EU, 7% for the U.S., 6% for Japan, and 
0% for Russia. 
 
In order to achieve this target, the Protocol has employed three mechanisms, known as the 
Kyoto mechanisms, while urging respective countries to make domestic reductions. 
Emissions trading is one of the Kyoto mechanisms. Suppose the reduction costs per unit of 
GHGs in Japan is 10, while that in Russia is only 1. If both countries are to reduce 1 unit 
respectively by themselves, it will cost 11. However, if only Russia is to reduce 2 units by 
itself, the reduction cost will be 2. In other words, emissions trading allows Japan to let 
Russia reduce Japan’s emissions by 1 unit by paying a cost ranging from 1 to 10. Emissions 
trading is to set positive prices on GHGs emissions that have been free before. 
 
Another of the Kyoto mechanisms is Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Suppose a 
                                                   
1  As for the Kyoto Protocol, see the home page of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
ClimateChange (http://www.unfccc.de/index.html).   2
country with an emissions cap, for example, Japan, builds power plants in a country 
without an emissions cap, for example, China. In this system, the difference between GHG 
emissions that would otherwise be caused by power generation using conventional 
Chinese technology in Chinese plants and those which would otherwise be caused by 
power generation using Japanese technology in will be considered as joint reductions by 
Japan and China. The last of the Kyoto mechanisms is called Joint Implementation (JI), 
which enables the transfer of emission reductions through technological transfer, etc., 
among countries with an emissions cap. 
 
Joint Fulfillment could perhaps be called the fourth Kyoto mechanism. For example, 15 
respective countries in the EU have made the unified commitment of 8% reduction below 
1990 levels across the board, but the reallocation among themselves is approved. 
 
The economic explanation of the Kyoto mechanisms is just to protect the earth through the 
pricing of GHG emission. There is criticism towards emissions trading, such as “it entrusts 
the fate of the earth to the speculation elite”2  or “it allows those who cannot make actual 
reductions to buy virtual emission reductions.”3  However, these criticisms are mere 
misunderstandings.  
 
We can expect to minimize the total global abatement cost utilizing the Kyoto mechanisms 
through equating the marginal GHG abatement cost of each country. At the same time, the 
mechanisms may mitigate inequality among countries in achieving respective abatement 
targets, which differ country by country in the Kyoto Protocol. A country with a high 
marginal abatement cost can achieve its target through obtaining emission credits from 
markets, rather than reducing emissions domestically. On the other hand, a country with a 
low marginal abatement cost can sell surplus emission credits if it over-achieves its target. 
As a result, economic burden differences among countries become smaller. In this aspect, 
the Kyoto mechanisms have a characteristic as a relief measure that equalizes economic 
loads of each country, which were unfairly allocated through political negotiations. 
 
3. Strategies of the EU, the U.S., and Japan 
 
Let us look at the strategies of the EU, the U.S., and Japan regarding the Kyoto Protocol. In 
                                                   
2  See Shohei Yonemoto, “CO2 International Emissions Trading: Risky American Proposal,” Ronza, 
June 1997, pp.112-5, in Japanese.   
3  NHK TV program, “Greedy Society: How far Markets prevail?” December 2000.   3
Figure 1, the horizontal axis represents the amount of CO24 emitted to produce the GDP of 
US$ 1 million evaluated in purchasing power parity (CO2 ton), and the vertical axis 
represents CO2 emissions per capita (CO2 kg) in major countries in 1996. In this figure, the 
more you go to the upper-right direction, the less efficient the country will be. The slope of 
a line between the origin and each point shows GDP per capita (US$10,000). Therefore, the 
steeper the slope becomes, the larger the GDP per capita will be. When there are no points 
representing other countries in the upper-right direction from a given country’s point, that 
country can be considered as an inefficient country.    The U.S., Australia, Russia, Ukraine 
are considered as such. They can be called “inefficient countries” in CO2 emissions. These 
countries form a group called the “Umbrella” in negotiations over the Protocol.5 The 
efficiency of the major EU countries, such as U.K. and Germany, is relatively high. As for 
Japan, CO2 emissions in terms of both GDP and per capita are a little lower compared with 
Germany and U.K. However, it can be considered comparable to typical EU countries 
when at least evaluated in terms of both of the two indicators. Located near the origin 
along the horizontal axis are developing countries such as China, India, Indonesia, and 
Bangladesh. It should be noted that India and Bangladesh are more efficient than the U.S. 
in terms of emissions per GDP. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 is around here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Figure 2 shows the respective total emissions of CO2 in major countries.6  The base year for 
reduction stipulated in the Protocol is 1990. The emissions of the former USSR, namely 
current Russia and Ukraine, etc., were reduced approximately 40% below 1990 levels in 
1998 due to an economic recession. As the reduction target of Russia and Ukraine is 0% 
below 1990 levels, they can sell these excess reductions of 40% as emission permits. 
However, this portion called “hot air,” is criticized by NGOs under the argument that these 
countries can sell such portions as emission permits without any reduction effort. “Hot air” 
is the result of problematic target setting of the Kyoto Protocol, which decided on 
                                                   
4  Emission trend analysis of CO2, the data of which is easily available, can be regarded as the 
analysis of all GHGs because CO2 occupies 80 to 90% of the total GHG emissions.   
5  The Umbrella is a negotiating group of countries consisting of Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, 
New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Ukraine, the U.S.A., but it is not a group of Joint Fulfillment such as 
the EU. 
6  Data are based upon Handbook of Energy and Economy, Ed., Econometric Analysis Division of the 
Institute of Energy Economics, Japan.     4
respective targets with political compromises based on the emissions of the single year of 
1990, ignoring aftermath economic situations of each country, etc. At the least, target 
setting after and including the second commitment period should avoid such a problem. 
The problem, however, may not be “hot air” itself, but the fact that “hot air” is in the hands 
of “inefficient countries.” The characteristic of the U.S. and Australia, which are also 
members of the “inefficient countries,” is that their emissions have increased compared 
with 1990 levels. On the other hand, in Germany and U.K., emissions are declining. 
Regarding Japan, emissions in 1999 had increased 6.8% over the 1990 level, which requires 
a reduction of 12.8% as of 1999 to achieve the Protocol target. This is one of the reasons that 
Japan is included in the Umbrella group, along with the U.S. and other countries. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Figure 2 is around here 
-------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------- 
Table 1 is around here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Let us look at the position of the EU.7  The total GHG emissions of the EU in 1990 was 
about 1,144 million tC, with the main emitting countries of Germany and U.K. holding 
share of 341 million tC and 199 million tC respectively (See table 1). Each reallocated target 
of EU countries by the above-mentioned “Joint Fulfillment”(so-called “Bubble”) 
mechanism varies widely, from a 27% increase to 28% reduction from the baseline of 1990 
emissions. We can see the true required abatement margins by comparing these reallocated 
internal EU targets with respective emission increase/decrease projections without 
measures (BAU projections) around 2010.8  For example, though Germany’s 21% reduction 
seems to be large, it is just a 5% reduction from its BAU projection and not such a wide 
reduction margin. The reduction margin of the EU as a whole is just 6% from BAU 
projections. We can thus understand that the 26% reduction margin required of Japan is 
quite large compared with that of major countries of the EU.   
                                                   
7  See also J. Gummer and R. Moreland, “The European Union and Global Climate Change: A Review 
of Five National Programmes,” Pew Center on Global Climate Change, June 2000 
(http://www.pewclimate.org/projects/pol_review.cfm). 
8  Emission projections without measures are called BAU (Business As Usual) projections. BAU 
projections are merely projections and should be treated with some discounts, though other 
countries reviewed these figures. However, BAU should be the baseline when we consider needed 
reduction margins taking into account respective economic growth projections, etc.       5
 
As for the respective required abatement amount from the 1990 GHG emission baseline 
after the reallocation, we can see that Germany shoulders 77% of the total EU reduction 
and U.K. accounts for 27%. Although the reduction amounts of these two countries surpass 
the total EU reduction, these two countries have special circumstances, such as the 
reunification of Germany and the drastic change in energy supply structure.   
 
Let us further consider these special situations of Germany and U.K. Firstly, Germany and 
U.K. are taking advantage of the base year set as 1990. It was in 1990 that the unification of 
East and West Germany — the emergence of the largest CO2 emitting country of the EU— 
was realized. In other words, East Germany, which was an “inefficient country” with hot 
air, joined this group. Looking at the regional breakdown of CO2 emissions in Germany, 
the emissions in the former East Germany region showed a 44% decrease compared with 
the 1990 level, while those in the former West Germany region showed a 2% increase, in 
1995. In total, Germany as a whole showed a 12% decrease. The CO2 emission reduction 
achieved in East Germany by 1995 accounts for about a half of the German emission 
reduction target.9 Thus the real reduction target of Germany can be considered as not 21%, 
but less than 10%. According to the UNFCCC data, Germany realized a large emission 
reduction by 1998, the level of which was about 84% of 1990. A significant part of this 
reduction seems to have materialized in the East Germany region. As a reference, we can 
point out that German per capita CO2 emission in 1998, which is after such a large 
reduction, is still 17% larger than that of Japan.10  Secondly, both Germany and U.K. had 
used a lot of coal, which causes greater CO2 emissions. In both countries, a switchover 
from coal to natural gas took place mainly after 1990. Germany and U.K. are being 
supplied natural gas respectively from Russia and from oil fields in the North Sea. They 
made a shift to natural gas because the price was cheaper. For example, in the U.K., the 
energy switch from coal to gas is in progress due to energy market liberalization unrelated 
to the Kyoto Protocol. If we take into account the foreseeable progress of the energy market 
liberalization up to 2010, we can say that the U.K. can achieve the reallocated internal EU 
target, which surpasses the U.K.’s Kyoto target, only with the liberalization, which has a 
negative cost. In this context, the U.K.’s real reduction target can be recognized as zero.11 
                                                   
9  We make this argument assuming GHG emissions after 1990 remain at the 1990 level.     
10  International Energy Agency, “Key World Energy Statistics from the IEA-2000 Edition,” 
November 2000 
11  Japanese energy market liberalization, which is still at a very initial stage, probably will bring 
about a completely different outcome. This is because gas available in Japan costs nearly triple the 
international market price and the only cheap energy source available in Japan is coal. Thus, simple   6
In fact, the latest U.K.’s BAU projection of 2010 is below the U.K.’s internal EU target.12   
 
It can be said that the EU position in negotiations over the Protocol is determined by the 
unification of Germany as well as oil fields in the North Sea and the pipelines of natural gas. 
Furthermore, 10 Eastern European countries with hot air are to join the EU in the future, 
which could facilitate the achievement of the reduction target despite the absence of actual 
reductions.  
 
Among the EU, some countries are relying on the Bubble and do not reduce GHG 
emissions significantly within their territories. The EU Bubble virtually allows countries 
such as Greece, Spain, and Sweden to hand their major portion of reduction on to other EU 
countries, such as Germany and U.K.13 In addition, there are countries like the Netherlands 
that stated positively to utilize cheap foreign reductions of the Kyoto mechanisms for half 
of their reduction amount. The Kyoto Protocol has a spirit that tries to make the best use of 
cost effective reduction opportunities all over the world. Japan should reconsider its 
domestic-dominant emission reduction plan comprehensively, paying serious attention to 
cross-border options along with the spirit, as other countries are doing. 
  
With how much cost, then, will the EU be able to reduce GHGs? According to a survey by 
the EU, the marginal abatement cost (MAC) for reducing emissions by 8% below the 1990 
level is about 70 euro (about 8 thousand yen) per ton of carbon.14  This figure is estimated 
to increase to about 150 euro (about 16 thousand yen) per ton of carbon when the EU does 
not use the EU Bubble. On the other hand, the MAC of Japan for achieving the Protocol 
target is said to be around 30 thousand yen per ton of carbon in many cases, with extreme 
case reaching over 100 thousand yen per ton of carbon.15  If the Kyoto mechanisms fully 
function, and the U.S. participates in the Protocol, an international price per ton of carbon 
                                                                                                                                                      
energy market liberalization in Japan is likely to increase not gas, but coal, which has a high carbon 
content.  
12  Although the U.K. does not have to take any measures to achieve the Kyoto target, the U.K. set its 
own target of a 20% reduction from the 1990 level and is considering taking additional actions. The 
U.K. can sell surplus credits from the Kyoto baseline to other countries.   
13  According to the authors’ estimation based on BAU projections, Greece’s 94%reductions, Spain’s 
70%, and Sweden’s 67%, will not achieved within those respective countries, but such as in Germany 
and U.K., due to the EU Bubble. The EU adamantly insisted that other countries outside EU should 
not rely on outside-border reductions for more than 50%, utilizing the fact that it is not widely 
known that some countries within the EU are dependent on outside-border reductions of more than 
50.  
14 http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/enveco/climate_change/sectoral_objectives.htm 
15 See  http://www.env.go.jp/council/06earth/y062-08/mat02.pdf   7
is said to be around US$20 to 70. This means that the EU will be able to achieve the 
Protocol target efficiently within their boundaries with the EU Bubble, which can be 
considered reliable and unlimited emissions trading, without depending on the Kyoto 
mechanisms at all.   
 
If so, the diplomatic strategy of the EU, which acts in the EU’s interest, is to acquire a 
relatively favorable position compared with outside of the EU, by making the Kyoto 
mechanisms inconvenient for the Umbrella group countries. In other words, their 
negotiation cards would include: the limitation on emissions trading, etc., as much as 
possible; no forest management sinks; and the strict operation of CDM. Furthermore, 
environment-oriented political powers within and outside of the EU responded to that and 
have been supporting limitation on the use of the Kyoto mechanisms. On the other hand, 
the EU is trying not to limit emissions trading within the EU as much as possible to 
minimize the total costs all over their region, while trying to set a limit on international 
emissions trading.16  In other words, the EU is intentionally trying to apply different 
policies inside and outside of their region. 
 
However, in response to President Bush’s statement, “I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because 
the Kyoto Protocol was fatally flawed in fundamental ways, though the process used to 
bring nations together to discuss our joint response to climate change is important. The 
Protocol is not effective in preventing global warming, exempting 80%of the world, 
including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance. In addition, 
the Protocol may cause serious harm to the U.S. and the world economy due to its 
exceedingly precipitous targets,”17  the diplomatic strategy of the EU has entirely changed, 
which made them greatly compromise to the Umbrella group in the resumed session of 
COP6 in Bonn this July. This is because the EU considered that there would be no other 
choices for the entry into force of the Protocol, as stated below, as well as because the 
international price of emission permits would be significantly lowered by using the Kyoto 
mechanisms without the U.S., which would force the EU themselves to somewhat depend 
on the mechanisms. The EU may have tried to keep its relatively advantageous position in 
the Kyoto framework over the U.S. , Japan, etc. Rejecting the Kyoto framework meets the 
U.S. interests, while preserving the Kyoto framework seems to meet the interest of the EU, 
which has to take some kind of domestic action due to domestic political pressures. For the 
                                                   
16  See EU’s green paper published in March 2000, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/docum/0087_en.htm 
17  These are not exact quotations from President Bush’s statement, but a summary of his claims.   8
EU, even making some compromises to the non-U.S. umbrella group in order to save the 
Protocol may have been a better option than killing the Protocol.   
 
CO2 emissions per capita in Japan continued to rise until the early 70s, when the increase 
almost stopped due to the oil shock in 1973 - 1974.  It continued to shift around 8 CO2t per 
capita thereafter, but it turned again into an increase since 1987. From 1990 to 1999, the 
increase in the industrial sector is 0.8%, while that in the transportation sector is 23 % and 
for the commercial and residential buildings sector it is 15%. In order to achieve the 
Protocol target based on 1990 levels, a reduction of 12.8% is required. However, it cannot 
be easily achieved even if an economic recession drags due to the structural reform of the 
Koizumi administration. Just after the adoption of the Protocol, the Japanese government 
decided on the General Principles on the Promotion of the Measures to Cope with Global 
Warming in a Cabinet meeting in June 1998.18  According to these General Principles, 
energy-derived CO2 emissions control is to be 0%, the emissions control of methane, etc., is 
to be –0.5%, reduction through technical innovation, etc., is to be –2.0%, reduction by sinks 
mainly from forest management is to be –3.7%, the emissions control of CFC substitutes, 
etc., to be +2%, and the use of the Kyoto mechanisms is to be –1.8%, which will be a total of 
–6%.    The policies in the General Principles are mainly based on command-and-control, 
and the share of those using the Kyoto mechanisms is 1.8%. These reduction target 
allocations were not decided based on some rational principle, such as minimizing 
compliance costs. There is no convincing explanation why the share of the Kyoto 
mechanism is 1.8%. While the EU and the U.S. seem to have been acting strategically for 
their national interests, Japan lacks an international and long-term strategy. Japanese 
measures are very passive, just aiming to achieve a 6% reduction from the 1990 emissions 
level. Japan, which has a relative advantage in energy-saving technologies and so on, 
should take more strategic actions and measures in order to make the best use of its relative 
strength. At the same time, Japan should balance emission reductions with other important 
policy goals, such as energy market liberalization, energy security, and international 
industrial competitiveness preservation, which are not always compatible with abatement 
measures.    
 
The Japanese negotiation position changed dramatically in response to the U.S. objection 
toward ratification. The requirements for the entry into force of the Protocol are (i) that it 
must be ratified by more than 55 countries, and (ii) that it must be ratified by countries 
                                                   
18 http://www.env.go.jp/earth/cop3/kanren/suisin2.html   9
with an emissions cap whose aggregate 1990’s emissions is at least 55% of the total CO2 
emissions in 1990 of capped parties. The share of the U.S. in 1990 was 36.1% and that of 
Japan was 8.5%. Therefore, the total share excluding these two countries is to be 55.4%. As 
the shares of Canada and Australia are 3.3% and 2.1% respectively, the Protocol will not be 
able to come into effect if either of them do not ratify it following Japan. Canada is 
wavering between a choice of ratifying the Protocol without the U.S. or waiting for 
ratification by the U.S., while Australia is indicating that it might wait for the U.S. This 
means that Japan has become the pivotal player to decide the future of the Kyoto Protocol.   
 
In COP6 held in The Hague in November last year, an agreement was not reached because 
the proposal of President Pronk was refused by Germany and others. One of the biggest 
interests of the Japanese government at that conference was the treatment of sinks from 
LULUCF19  activities. Although it estimated a 3.7% reduction through sinks from forest 
management below the 1990 level in the General Principles, only 0.5% was to be approved 
in the Pronk proposal. Although President Pronk offered a compromising proposal of 3% 
to Japan in June, Japan refused to accept it, demanding to add more. Japan also did not 
clarify its attitude toward the ratification of the Protocol, saying the first thing to do is to 
urge the U.S. to come back to the Protocol regime. Although it was reasonable for Japan to 
maintain that attitude in order to proceed with the negotiation favorably to itself, the press 
and NGOs were offended. In the resumed session of COP6 in Bonn in July, the EU made 
substantial concessions to the Umbrella group, and Japan could secure a 3.9% reduction 
upper limit through sinks. It is said that Japan had almost all of its demands granted 
despite some remaining uncertainties. 
 
The Japanese government argued for a lax compliance system as well as no limits on the 
Kyoto mechanisms. If it intends to use the Kyoto mechanisms including emissions trading, 
it is essential to design a robust compliance system as well as not to set limits on the use of 
the mechanisms. In this regard, the argument of the government lacks consistency. In the 
Marrakech Accords20, the following statement is included: Each Party … shall maintain, in 
its national registry, a commitment period reserve which should not drop below 90% of 
the Party's assigned amount calculated pursuant to Article 3, paragraphs 7 and 8, of the 
Protocol, or 100 per cent of five times its most recently reviewed inventory, whichever is   
lowest. This reserve system has some problems, though it seems to be well-thought out for 
                                                   
19  LULUCF stands for Land Use and Land-Use Change and Forestry, including forest management. 
20  COP7 was held in Marrakech, Morocco in October to November 2001 and reached the so-called 
Marrakech Accords, which generally followed the Bonn Agreement.     10
preventing overselling of so-called hot air.21  First of all, reserves mean supply limits, 
which makes the price of emission permits or the compliance cost of buyer countries such 
as Japan higher than that in a case without reserves. The Japanese government tolerated 
the reserve system, and deferred the issue of a legally binding penalty system.22  
 
Then, how is the U.S. strategy? The U.S. Senate decided the followings by consensus in the 
summer of 1997. First, developing countries also need to have emissions reduction 
commitments. Second, the Protocol should not have a severely negative impact on the U.S. 
economy. Third, the ratification of the Protocol cannot be approved unless both of two 
requirements above are fulfilled. Although in Kyoto, the then Vice President Gore accepted 
a 7% reduction below the 1990 level, the U.S. emissions increased by 12.5% over the 1990 
level in 1998 reflecting its economic boom in the 1990s. It means that they had to make 
19.5% reduction as of 1998. Compared before (1972) and after (1982) the two oil shocks, 
CO2 emissions in the U.S. have been somewhat reduced. However, they increased by 
23.6% in 1998 over the 1982 level. It can be said that the U.S.’s Protocol target will be 
difficult achieve unless something equivalent to continuous oil shocks, inter alia, a large 
amount of domestic carbon tax or a command-and-control type regulation, is introduced. 
The U.S., which does not favor tax and regulations, tried to widen the accounting of 
domestic forest sinks and aimed to design a system that would not limit the use of 
mechanisms that would utilize overseas reductions. However, it can be said that these 
ways were cut off by the EU strategy.23  The abandonment of the Protocol by the Bush 
administration means that the U.S. has returned to the position of the 1997’s Senate’s 
decisions. However, the Bonn Agreement and Marrakech Accords should facilitate the 
U.S.’s return to the framework of the Protocol, due to a substantial concession by the EU.   
 
The situations of the EU, the U.S. and Japan are often compared to a wet towel. The EU is a 
wet towel with a substantial amount of water, which can be wrung. The problem is 
                                                   
21 http://www.unfccc.de/cop7/documents/accords_draft.pdf 
22  It has been a central issue to restrict the usage of the Kyoto mechanism, which is called 
supplementarity. See also K. Kaino, T. Saijo, and T. Yamato, “Economic Consequences of EU's 
Proposal of Quantity Restraints on the Kyoto Mechanism,” Energy and Resources,Vol. 21(2), March 
2000, pp.38-42, in Japanese. 
23  As for the U.S. Climate Change Review - Initial Report, see 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/climatechange.pdf. It is impossible to design 
an institution or a treaty where every party ratifies it when the issue is an international public good 
such as global warming. As a theoretical framework, see T. Saijo and T. Yamato, "A Voluntary 
Participation Game with a Non-Excludable Public Good," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.84, 
pp.227-242, 1999.   11
whether the towel can be wrung after year 2013 when decarbonization, etc., is to be 
completed. Japan is a towel almost dried, with little water to be wrung. It is even uncertain 
whether it can achieve the Protocol target unless significant technology or people’s 
lifestyles change. The U.S. is a wet towel with abundant water, but it is less willing to 
wring it, holding the American lifestyle and national interests as an excuse. It is also one of 
the problems in the Protocol that the EU, the U.S. and Japan have almost similar reduction 
commitments though their national conditions are quite different.   
  
4. After Kyoto 
 
Let us probe into problems in the Protocol. The first problem is that it took too much time 
to reach the agreement. The practical start point of the Protocol was COP1 in 1995 in Berlin, 
followed by COP3 where the numerical targets were set, and finally, the resumed session 
of COP6 and COP7 in 2001 at which operational rules were agreed upon. In the course of 
negotiations, many Cabinets were replaced in Japan and similar changes happened in other 
countries. If the negotiations are extended, they will be more vulnerable to administrative 
policy changes of each country, and thus the negotiations could become more complicated 
and extended. Economic environments and other conditions, which set political positions 
of each country, also change in the meantime. For example, the U.S. has been hit by energy 
crises such as the electricity crisis in California and economic recession. In addition, it will 
be from 2008 to 2012, the first commitment period, in which the numerical targets will be 
applied. It is quite difficult to predict economic conditions of each party during the first 
commitment period. As for the political aspect, it is quite unlikely that an administration 
that ratifies the Protocol will remain after the end of the first commitment period, when 
compliance of the country will become clear. There is a possibility that a country accepts a 
difficult reduction target as an impermanent political stand play of an administration at 
that time. At the same time, we should pay attention to the fact that global warming 
prevention measures need a certain amount of long-term vision. For example, ten years is 
not enough if we consider the lead-time that is necessary for the construction of a power 
plant. In the case of Japan, a power plant construction plan beyond the year 2010 is already 
set, and it will be fairly difficult to change the plan. In order to lead such investment 
activities, which need long-term prediction, toward a desirable direction, the long-term 
policy path for 10 to 20 years should be known by private sectors. Therefore, the 
negotiations should decide the long-term goal within a short time period, clearly 
distinguishing the difference between showing long-term vision and taking time for 
making political compromises. The reason why it took such a long time for deciding the   12
operational rules of the Protocol is that the negotiation failed to follow the right order of 
decisions; reduction targets had been set before deciding details of the operational rules. 
Thus, in future decisions, the order should be changed: operational rules should be set first 
and the economic burden of each party should by clarified, and in the final stage reduction 
targets should be fixed. Otherwise, negotiation skills decide economic burdens of each 
party, and inequality in economic burdens will occur again as in the Kyoto process.     
 
The second problem is the base year for reduction. The important objective of UNFCCC 
was to stabilize GHG levels at 1990 levels by 2000. Although this objective was not 
achieved in most of the major countries, 1990 has been set as the base year tacitly in 
negotiation over the Protocol. The numerical targets seem to have been set with a country’s 
specific economic situation and equitability with other countries taken into consideration, 
but it still gives an impression that the establishment process of the targets was 
rough-and-ready. Ambassador Raúl A. Estrada-Oyuela of Argentina, who managed to 
settle negotiations over the Protocol, cannot show an objective rationale of why the 
Japanese target is a 6% reduction while the Australian target is an 8% increase. It is quite 
ironic that Japanese companies are trying to earn emission credits through afforestation in 
Australia, which won the 8% increase. Numerical reduction targets of the Kyoto Protocol 
are just political compromises that are not backed by scientific grounds. In addition, the 
targets were set hastily, when parties did not know their own economic burdens and at a 
stage without clear operational rules. As a result, the negotiations after COP3 became 
extremely complicated and eventually the U.S. seceded from the Kyoto regime. Moreover 
we should not overlook the fact that the Protocol places a heavier economic burden on 
countries that have been incorporating energy-saving measures before 1990, such as Japan, 
while placing less burden on energy-wasting countries which have not made efforts so far. 
This harsh reality may give an undesirable lesson to developing countries that have been 
observing the whole process. They may learn that early reduction does not pay, and that 
they should not take early measures before they come to have to accept numerical 
reduction targets in the future.   
 
The third problem is that country specific figures for sinks were virtually decided in the 
political negotiations at the resumed session of COP6 in an artificial way, after the 
numerical reduction targets had been decided at COP3. Forest and other type absorption 
figures should be decided at least based on scientific evidence instead of negotiations. The 
problem is that those baseless numerical targets had been decided before detailed rules 
were set.     13
 
The fourth problem is that developing countries do not participate in the Protocol as was 
indicated by the U.S. We should not slight the effect of carbon leakage. Japan, which has to 
make a drastic emissions reduction while its major trading partners do not have GHG 
reduction commitments, may face serious problems. Remedies for global warming must be 
in a global system that can really reduce GHG emissions globally. Even if a party cleans up 
its own domain --- complies to the emission target, if neighbor countries increase their 
emissions --- if other non-binding countries increase GHG emissions due to carbon leakage, 
such as energy-intensive industry transfer from binding countries to non-binding countries, 
in the aggregate total, global GHG emissions do not decrease and emissions abatement 
efforts in developed countries do not contribute to global warming prevention. A country 
that takes emission reduction measures may encounter political difficulty in obtaining 
domestic consensus because it looses employment and value-added unnecessarily. There 
are some options for developing countries, which are not likely to restrain their economic 
growth, such as per unit energy use targets and so forth. Burdens and benefits distribution 
in the Kyoto Protocol, in which developing country parties have virtually no obligation and 
just one-sidedly receive funds and technologies from developed country parties, make it 
difficult to conduct equal footing negotiations and operations over the Protocol. The 
following paragraphs are intending to offer practical proposals to resolve these problems. 
 
Given that the Protocol is to be effective, we have to start developing a new protocol for a 
period after 2013 by 2005. We also have to avoid wasting time in choosing an adequate 
base year. For that purpose, a country-specific GHG emissions path for 2013-2017 must be 
established. Objective and reasonable establishment of the GHG emissions path only can 
prevent notorious hot air as well as allow parties to set internationally equal emission 
reduction targets. The selection of a path may depend on reduction efforts that have been 
made by a country concerned, its economic performance, its weather and climate, its 
energy consumption pattern, forest sinks, emissions per GDP and so on. This path must not 
be decided in a plenary session of the COP, but in a team, which consists of experts from 
three countries, each representing developed countries, semi-developed countries, and 
developing countries.  When an emissions path for Japan is to be decided, the team should 
consist of experts from such three countries excluding Japan itself. In other words, an 
emissions path for one’s own country would not be decided by the country concerned but 
by other countries.24  In this case, Japan would also of course, be involved in the decision 
                                                   
24  This type of method in the theory of institutional design, see T. Saijo, "Strategy Space Reduction in 
Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica 56(3), 693-700, May   14
by providing information to these three decision-making countries, but the 
decision-making itself would be done by the three evaluating countries. Through such 
process, there would be a smaller possibility of making favorable allowances for each other 
compared with other cases including bilateral evaluation. As a result, this would give 
objectivity to an evaluation itself. Moreover, it would facilitate as well as save time for a 
decision compared with a process in a plenary, as an evaluation is to be made by only three 
countries. This process must be implemented in all of the UNFCCC ratifying countries. In 
case of a country without enough human resources, organizations including the 
International Energy Agency would give a support. 
 
After country-specific emissions paths have been decided, reduction schedules would be 
decided at annual Conference of the Parties (COP). Emissions paths for developing 
countries may be approved as they are, while developed countries may be required to 
reduce more. It is quite important that the reduction schedules are set favorably for 
countries that have been making early voluntary reductions, though in the existing Kyoto 
Protocol, countries that have made efforts before 1990 suffer a disadvantage. For example, 
equating abatement margins from the approved emissions path may ensure international 
equity. In addition, some encouraging treatment for a country that has achieved higher 
energy-saving standards, which can be judged based on present energy intensity and so on, 
would be desirable. This is because a country with a higher energy-saving level may face 
heavier marginal abatement costs and economic burdens if abatement targets are set at the 
same level as energy-wasting countries. For example, emission reduction targets for normal 
developed country parties can be set at a 15% reduction from their own emission paths, 
and a country that achieved higher energy-saving can receive some discounts according to 
its materialized per unit emission level, while a country that has made less effort has to 
compensate and make greater reductions.   
 
Global warming is a problem brought about by cumulative GHG emissions, as GHGs 
remain in the atmosphere for about 50 to 200 years. If we follow the claims of developing 
countries, that global warming until now has been caused by cumulative GHG emissions 
mainly made by developed countries, we should differentiate emission reduction targets 
according to cumulative per capita emissions. For example, in terms of current per capita 
emission flow, there is not much of a difference among Japan, the U.K., and Germany. 
However, if we pay attention to the past 50 years, during which GHG emissions increased 
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explosively and during which cumulative GHG emissions account for about 80% of the 
total GHG emissions since the industrial revolution, and assume per capita cumulative 
responsibility can be obtained through dividing the past 50 year cumulative emissions by 
current population, it can be noted that emissions of Germany and the U.K. are roughly 
two times bigger than that of Japan (See table 2). Taking into account the fact that 
cumulative emissions means giving advantageous treatments to a country that has made 
early voluntary actions, this type of adjustment seems to be desirable.           
 
-------------------------------------- 
Table 2 is around here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
On the other hand, the U.S. and others deny the cumulative responsibility, insisting that 
past emissions were already done before we recognized the risk of global warming, and 
that the reason why developed countries should tackle emission abatement on their own 
initiative is that developed countries are rich and can afford to take measures. In the world 
of criminal law, a widely accepted legal principle is that if an action was not predetermined 
as a crime, we cannot punish the action retroactively. Although in this context the claim of 
the U.S. seems to be appropriate, few people object to providing some incentives for early 
voluntary emission reductions.     
 
If we really want to prevent global warming, it is extremely important to establish some 
mechanisms that give incentives for early voluntary reduction efforts of developing 
countries. We should establish such tangible mechanisms and clearly prove that early 
actions for emission reductions are beneficial for developing countries. The existing Kyoto 
scheme discourages early voluntary actions of developing countries, because the greater 
the level of emission reductions a country voluntarily undertakes, the higher the marginal 
abatement costs will be when developing countries accept emission reduction targets in the 
future. Establishment of an objective emission path is also valid in this context.       
 
Each country would use emissions trading and joint implementation (JI) as flexible 
mechanisms while implementing domestic reduction. As all countries participate in this 
system, CDM would be integrated into JI, and CDM specific problems including the 
measurement of emission reductions generated from CDM could be avoided.   
 
Even in this system, however, there remains a possibility that the global total emissions   16
would increase due to the participation of developing countries. To avoid this, the global 
total target – which would be set less than the total of national targets - would be set 
separately from country specific targets, and the administrative organization of emissions 
trading would keep emission permits supplied from developing countries to abandon 
some of them. If the equivalent cost of this abandoned emission permits’ value is borne by 
developed countries in proportion to their accumulative emissions amount in the past, this 
system can also ask for differentiated responsibilities based on cumulative emissions.   
 
5. Domestic Policies in Japan 
 
As Figure 2 shows, although Japan also experienced the two oil shocks, its total CO2 
emissions have increased when compared before and after the oil shocks. As in the case of 
the U.S., it is also difficult for Japan to achieve the Protocol target unless something 
equivalent to continuous oil shocks or policies with more effect are introduced. Remember 
the two oil shocks raised the price of crude oil ten times higher.   
 
Securing its line in the General Principles almost as it is in the Bonn Agreement and 
Marrakech Accords, the Japanese government is likely to take command-and-control type 
measures.25  In this case, the first problem is that entities escaping from regulatory 
loopholes would benefit, while those taking measures according to regulations would lose. 
The second problem is that entities whose marginal reduction costs are low would not 
reduce more than the regulatory level while entities whose costs are high would have to 
pay significant costs for reduction. Therefore, total costs could not be minimized in terms 
of the national total. The third problem is that a system regulating all over Japan must be 
maintained. This would require transaction costs and would also create various rights and 
interests. The fourth problem is that the international price of emission permits would be 
lowered by the absence of Japan – which is expected to have a large demand for emission 
permits – in the emissions trading market, which would make the reduction costs of Japan 
relatively higher than other countries including the EU. The fifth problem is that if the 
Protocol comes into effect without the U.S., and Japan takes a command-and-control line, 
the emissions trading market will become too small to function.   
 
We must design a simple and transparent system while avoiding these problems. Possible 
systems that could realize this objective are carbon tax and domestic emissions trading. 
                                                   
25  See T. Kusakawa and T. Saijo, “Economic Consequences of Japan's Isolationism on Global 
Warming,” Economic Seminar, December 2000, pp.36-41, in Japanese.   17
Given that the Protocol target is considered as an international commitment that must be 
achieved, simply a carbon tax alone may not achieve this target. Of course, we can use the 
Kyoto mechanisms to achieve reductions that could not be covered by the tax. However, in 
the current situation where the emissions amount of a given year is confirmed 1-2 years 
after that year, emission permits have to be obtained with consideration to some extra 
amount.  
 
Therefore, we would like to propose here an upstream emissions trading system as a 
simple and transparent system that would ensure the achievement of the Protocol target. In 
such a system, the domestic importers of fossil fuels cannot sell their products without 
emission permits. This system will be able to reduce the number of participating entities 
and to minimize transaction costs compared with the downstream trading of fossil fuel 
consumption. Moreover, this system can secure equitability because the price of emission 
permits is to be set at the upstream, as well as create an incentive for reduction investment 
also at the downstream due to the price increase of goods and services that are fossil fuel 
intensive. It will be possible of course, that the consumers of fossil fuels may buy emission 
permits abroad and get fossil fuels by presenting them to importers. The acquisition of 
emission permits overseas is also possible through CDM and JI, as well as emissions 
trading. The results of investments in GHG reduction technology including afforestation 
can be utilized not only within Japan but also in foreign countries. Therefore, in this regard, 
we should aim to be an “environmental trading country” instead of an “environmentally 
isolated country” by pursuing the General Principles. In the future, we might become able 
to hear the price of CO2 permits per ton everyday on TV news. 
 
We often come across an argument that the pricing of GHG emissions through emissions 
trading would hamper economic growth. This is not necessarily true. If GHG emissions 
come to be adequately priced, various technological improvements will take place in order 
to restrain this. This technological progress will lead to the creation of new industries to 
change the Japanese industrial structure itself. Through this process, we will be led to 
sustainable economic development.26  We have to take notice of the phrase “adequately 
priced” here. For example, if Japanese carbon prices ascend too much through introducing 
severe reduction targets only in Japan and not in neighboring trading partners, it may 
result in facilitating only a hollowing out of Japanese industries, and global GHG emission 
reductions may not be achieved. In a comparison between investments for transferring 
                                                   
26  See T. Ono, “Environmental Tax Policy in a Model of Growth Cycles,” University of Tsukuba, 
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production bases abroad and for environmentally sound technology development, the 
former is overwhelmingly easier in the current globalized economy and more compatible 
with highly prioritized management goals, namely augmentation of short-term profits of 
stockholders. When only Japan faces the sharp emission reductions, foreseeable markets for 
the new technologies that can be developed by new investments are smaller, and expected 
returns from the technologies are also smaller, because only Japan can be a market at least 
in the near future.     
 
Furthermore, there is another problem for Japan to be examined, which is flexibility of the 
Japanese economy for new technologies. This is because the dissemination speed of new 
technologies in Japan seems to be slower than ever, since already the matured Japanese 
market will shrink in the future as its population will reach a peak in 2007 and decrease 
afterwards. Even if epoch-making technologies are developed in the near future, Japan 
may not be able to utilize them immediately due to a slower technology switchover. 
Looking back over a history of capital-intensive raw material industry such as iron and 
steel, we understand that a changeover to newly developed technologies has progressed 
parallel to economic growth and expansion, and not advanced so much under low 
economic growth periods. For example, the Japanese iron and steel industry has become far 
superior to U.S. counterparts partly because Japan introduced new highly efficient facilities 
and equipment along with high-growth of the economy. At that time, the U.S. iron and 
steel industry seemed to be in weak position against emerging economies, such as Japan, 
and could not introduce new technologies because using old and inefficient but fully 
depreciated facilities and equipment was only way to maintain its cost competitiveness. We 
should pay heed to this kind of concern, though it may be too pessimistic to consider that 
the Japanese economy will follow the same path as the U.S. iron and steel industry that was 
surpassed by Japanese companies. We should clearly recognize that this sort of 
apprehension comes not from pricing GHG emissions, but from unequal imposition of 
tough GHG emission reduction targets on a small number of countries such as Japan. If 
emission reduction targets of some countries are too sheer when developed countries 
including South Korea are treated favorably without emission caps, only negative aspects 
of the emission cap, such as carbon leakage, become significant, and positive aspects of 
emission reduction efforts are covered. In this context, although reduction targets of about 
6% from BAU projections for the EU seem to be reasonable, the Japanese reduction target 
in the existing Kyoto regime of more than a 20% reduction from BAU projections, can be 
regarded as wide enough to worry about the negative effects. 
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When introducing an upstream emissions trading system, we should consider some special 
treatments, such as mitigation or exemption of carbon taxes or additional carbon prices, for 
companies that have and are implementing somewhat objective and binding GHG 
emission reduction plans like “Keidanren Voluntary Action Plan on the Environment 
(Measures against Global Warming).” An upstream emissions trading system has the same 
effect on downstream companies, as carbon taxes do. Prices of energy and carbon related 
goods in downstream are increased reflecting emission permit prices and fund transfer 
from downstream companies to upstream companies occur to compensate increased fossil 
fuel costs in the upstream. Thus an upstream emissions trading system also gives rise to 
international competitiveness problems of industries as carbon taxes do. In many cases 
some special treatments, such as reductions of or exemption from taxes, are made from the 
point of concerns on industry competitiveness and so on, when carbon taxes were 
introduced in the EU. An upstream emissions trading system also requires the same kind 
of arrangements. If downstream companies keep some amount of funds in hand through 
such special treatment and face some pressures about GHG emission reductions from the 
government or NGOs, they use the funds voluntarily in additional capital spending for 
emission reductions or new technology development. Only the downstream end 
companies know really effective and efficient investment options for GHG emission 
reductions in the downstream, partly because those opportunities are continuously 
changing parallel to technology and business environment development. Therefore, 
voluntary actions of adequately motivated companies by the objective action plans seem to 
be more efficient than governmental fund redistribution after receiving fund transfer 
through taxation.    ç  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
We had an opportunity to talk with Mr. Seluka from Tuvalu, which is an island country 
with coral atolls in the South Pacific, at the resumed session of COP6 in Bonn. The 
population of this country is 12,000. He said their immediate problem was the increase of 
seawater flow into wells. He said sorrowfully, “We have to ask for overseas support 
because we have no technology to remove salts.” This might be an unnecessary 
technology for such a country if there was not the rising sea level problem. We could not 
help but think about their future, in which the coral atolls will go under water together 
with their wonderful culture, and in which the people will be forced to migrate overseas 
only to experience discrimination and oppression as well as the loss of their identity.    We 
also heard a statement by Professor Dr. A. Atiq Rahman from the Bangladesh Centre for   20
Advanced Studies that “we should not choose a path where we would pursue economic 
development with the help of ODAs, polluting environment as well as emitting GHGs, 
only to end up with being transferred GHGs reduction technology”, at a NGOs meeting 
on technological transfer. Developing countries themselves are also facing with a problem 
of free-ride. Positions of developing countries, whose primary goal is economic 
development and poverty alleviation, are difficult partly because prevention of global 
warming is a typical prisoners’ dilemma. Although the payoff for global cooperation is 
clearly the highest as a whole, a developing country may obtain higher benefits through 
taking opposite measures or through not taking any actions at all when the majority of 
other countries take actions for preventing global warming. For example, creating an 
energy-intensive and wasteful economy may be a short cut for economic development and 
poverty reduction when energy prices go down through global warming prevention 
actions of other countries.       
 
From the point of economic efficiency, there are more difficult problems for global 
warming prevention measures. We can assume the future abatement cost will be lower 
than now when we predict continuous technological development. If so, early actions are 
relatively expensive and impose high economic burdens. In addition, we cannot completely 
deny the perspective that adaptation for global warming is more efficient than prevention 
when we cannot surely say that the negative effect of global warming is irreversible. In 
terms of the cost benefit of global warming prevention measures, it is obvious that the 
biggest beneficiaries of present measures are the future generations in developing countries. 
In addition, if we calculate the net present value of future benefits from current measures, 
the net present value of global warming prevention measures is negligibly small because 
the benefits will be materialized several decades or centuries after. As mentioned above, 
from the point of pure cost benefit analysis, there is less convincing economic reasons for 
immediate actions of developed countries. In addition, uncertainty from the lack of 
scientific knowledge makes it more difficult.   
 
The Bonn Agreement and Marrakech Accords also stipulate to narrow the per capita 
emissions gap between developed and developing countries. Although it is not indicated in 
Figure 1, if we look at the changes over time (1971-1998), they show each country has been 
moving left, across the board. In other words, although the efficiency per GDP has 
improved, CO2 emissions per capita have not indicated any remarkable change. Per capita 
differences have not been narrowed for the past 30 years either within developed countries 
or between developed and developing countries. The Environmental Kuznets Curve shows   21
that, in the long run, emissions per capita increase as income goes up, but it turns into a 
decrease when income reaches a certain level.27  This effect may have not been seen during 
a period of only 30 years, but we cannot wait for 50 years or 100 years to see the effect of 
the Environmental Kuznets Curve. It is necessary to design a mechanism that will lead 
each country to move toward the lower-left direction in Figure 1. The Kyoto Protocol is an 
agreement among countries that would serve for this objective as a first step, and does not 
present the domestic policies of each country. Although the Kyoto Protocol has many good 
points, such as a principle of differentiated responsibility with initiative of developed 
countries’ actions, it also has many problems, such as the absence of incentives for 
developing country parties to take early voluntary measures. If we consider the 
negotiations over the Protocol as a sort of pure game, the lesson learned from the Kyoto 
process may be that the smart way is to accept an emission cap after expanding emission 
allowances with inefficient facilities, as can be seen in transition economies; while the less 
intelligent way is to accept a severe emission cap that may hamper economic growth after 
significantly achieving high energy-saving standards, as can be seen in Japan. We can say 
that transition economies like Russia have acquired enormous additional fund transfer 
through hot air. Regarding the fund contribution to assist developing countries, an early 
voluntary big donor, Japan, which began large amounts of financial aids to developing 
countries as Kyoto initiatives since 1998, is in a disadvantageous position against other 
developed countries including the EU that have not contributed so much. The existing 
framework of the Kyoto Protocol never rewards a country that has made early voluntary 
actions with good will. The framework, including reduction target setting, has to be revised 
fundamentally in order to favor and provide incentives for early voluntary actions.     
 
It is also true in Japan that the Protocol objective cannot be achieved only by consumers 
with “awareness” that emphasize GHG reduction. Although it is of course important to 
have PR activities to increase consumers with awareness, it is more important to design a 
system including a mechanism that can control consumption through the price increase of 
goods and services that generate GHGs. In this context, neither a controlled society type 
system that tries to watch and control every action of each entity, nor a loose system that 
cannot prevent free-riders, are desirable.   
 
                                                   
27  See, for example, J. T. Roberts and P. E. Grimes, “Carbon Intensity and Economic Development 
1962-91: A Brief Exploration of the Environmental Kuznets Curve,” World Development, 25(2), 191-198, 
1997 and Noriyuki Goto, “Empirical Examination of the Relationship between Carbon Emissions and 
Economic Development,” The Proceedings of the Department of Advanced Social and International Studies,   22
Although we tend to look at per capita emissions, what should really be given attention 
may be the amount of GHGs directly/indirectly input in goods and services that are used 
by a given individual. Suppose one country produces goods that would produce a large 
amount of GHGs and another country produces services that would produce relatively 
smaller amount. Per capita emission might be larger in the former and smaller in the latter. 
However, they use other country’s goods and services through bilateral trading. This 
would then narrow the difference of GHG emissions per capita that have been input 
directly/indirectly into those goods and services. Therefore, it can be said that the entity to 
take responsibility is the consumer. In this regard, it is highly possible that the U.S., shown 
in Figure 1, is using more GHGs than the data from the perspective of consumers’ 
responsibility because it is buying goods and services from developing countries. 
 
We have to pay attention to an asymmetric information problem here in order to make the 
consumer responsibility work efficiently. Only producers of goods can efficiently and 
effectively know how much GHG emissions were caused in production of one good or 
service. We should also have a perspective of producer responsibility because only 
producers can directly control and reduce GHG emissions relating to production. Only 
after adequate information disclosure about GHG emissions from producers is 
materialized, can we have a necessary base for consumer responsibility. After that, if 
consumers choose goods and services made through production processes with fewer 
GHG emissions in terms of life cycle assessment, consumers can lead producers towards a 
desirable direction.   
 
North-South problem aspects of global warming prevention make this type of argument 
more difficult. Poverty is worsening the population explosion, and has a close relation with 
wasteful resource usage such as slash-and-burn farming. When we consider poverty 
alleviation, which is the common first priority in an international donor community, we 
cannot simply criticize the U.S. for importing goods that are made in developing countries 
under poor working conditions with extremely low wages. In developing countries, in 
which business conditions are poor with inefficient infrastructure and risky currency 
exchange systems, jobs exist because wages are low, compensating negative aspects in 
business environments. If wages are not low enough, people lose their jobs and are likely to 
suffer more severe poverty under even worse working conditions. Lack of due 
governmental governance in developing countries also makes solutions for this type of 
                                                                                                                                                      
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo, pp.111-148, March, 2001.   23
problem complicated. Without appropriate government, financial and technological aids 
are never used efficiently in originally intended ways by donor countries, as donors have 
learned from past experiences.   
 
As mentioned above, there are many difficult problems. However, it is a fact that many 
experts are doubtful about the continuation of the American resource wasting lifestyle, 
symbolized by mass production, mass consumption, and mass disposal. Thus it is obvious 
that we should aim at a direction towards a sustainable, resource-circulating society. 
Although it is quite difficult to create such a society with existing technology, it is also a 
fact that we are coming to a stage where we should take one step further towards such a 
direction. Each country needs to take responsible global warming prevention measures, 































































































































































































































Austria -8.0%  -13.0% -6.0%  -7.0% 21 -3 3.0%     6%  19% 
Belgium -8.0%  -7.5%  n.a.  n.a.  38 -3 3.1%    7%  15% 
Denmark -8.0%  -21.0% -26.0% 5.0% 20  -4 4.4%     9%  30% 
Finland -8.0%  0.0%  n.a.  n.a.  18 0 0.0%     1%  1% 
France -8.0%  0.0%  8.0%  -8.0% 138 0 0.0%     1%  1% 
Germany -8.0%  -21.0% -16.0% -5.0% 341 -72 76.7% 76.7% 76.7% 76.7%    36 -10.4% -16% 5% 
Greece -8.0%  25.0%  27.0%  -2.0% 27  7 -7.2%     18% -7% 
Ireland -8.0%  13.0% 33.0%  -20.0% 16 2 -2.2%     19% 6% 
Italy -8.0%  -6.5%  -4.0%  -2.5% 145 -9 10.1%    4%  11% 
Luxembourg -8.0%  -28.0% -43.0%  15.0% 4 -1 1.1%    -24%  4% 
Netherlands -8.0%  -6.0%  9.0%  -15.0% 59 -4 3.8%     8%  14% 
Portugal -8.0%  27.0%  68.0%  -41.0% 19 5 -5.4%     17% -10% 
Spain -8.0%  15.0% 25.0%  -10.0% 82  12- 13.2%    21% 6% 
Sweden -8.0%  4.0%  10.0% -6.0% 18  1 -0.8%    6%  2% 
U.K.   -8.0%  -12.5% -14.9% 2.4% 199 -25 26.6% 26.6% 26.6% 26.6%    25 0.1% -8%  5% 
Total   -8.0%    1,144 -93 100.0% 61 -2.8% - - - -2% 2% 2% 2%       6% 6% 6% 6%       
Reference 
：Japan 
-6.0%   20.0%  - - - -26.0% 26.0% 26.0% 26.0%    325 -19   10% 10% 10% 10%        16% 16% 16% 16%       
ç
*1ɿ”BAU Projection in 2010% change from 1990:c” is an increase or decrease ratio of projected GHG emissions without 
measures in 2010 based on the 1990 emission level. BAU stands for Business As Usual. Basically, data comes from 
materials of UNFCCC. The U.K. figure comes from the latest governmental projection published November 2001, 
which includes some policy effects. Here we treat it as BAU because policy effects except energy market liberalization 
seem to be very small. Data of Belgium and Finland come from their Second National Communications.   
*2ɿ”Net Target :b-c” is a margin between b and c. These are necessary reduction rates to achieve internal EU target, 
which virtually replace the Kyoto targets at an EU’s disposal. Figures without minus signs refer to a surplus that can be 
sold out to other countries without taking any policy measures. The Japanese figure, as a reference, is a margin 
between the Kyoto target and BAU projection.   
*3ɿ”GHG Emission Amount in ‘90:d” is total GHG emissions in 1990 before subtracting carbon sequestration or 
emissions from Land use and Land-use change and Forestry. Data comes from the table compiled by UNFCCC 
secretariat based on data of the second National Communication. CO2 tons were converted into carbon ton by 
multiplying 3/11.   
*4ɿ”Target Reduction Amount within EU” is “e= d  ʷçb”. Assuming emission amounts are stable between 1990 and 
2010. 
*5ɿ  “Share” is a percentage of each country’s target reduction amount when total EU target reduction amount is 100%.   
*6ɿ”Special factor” of Germany, 36 million carbon ton, is the materialized CO2 reduction amount in former East 
Germany until 1995 through economic rearrangements. Still, the former East Germany side is inefficient in terms of 
energy usage and Germany is likely to be able to easily reduce more in the former East Germany side. 
*7ɿ”Special factor” of U.K., 25 million carbon ton, is projected reduction until 2010 from energy market liberalization 
that has been facilitating energy changeover from coal to natural gas. By the end of 2000, 17 million carbon ton 
reduction seems to have been materialized. Parallel to energy market liberalization, subsidies and protection for U.K.’s 
coal industry has been reduced and oil & gas wells in North Sea have been developed. 
*8ɿ”Emission Trends:’98/’90: g” means actual GHG emission trends expressed in ratios to 1990 emission level.   
*9ɿ“Gaps: g-b” means differences between the actual emission in 1998 and internal EU targets.   
Data Source: 
1) The Secretariat of UNFCCC, FCCC/CP/1998/11/Add.2, Oct. 1998, 2) The Secretariat of UNFCCC, 
FCCC/SBI/2000/INF.13, Oct. 2000, 3) The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, "Second Report of the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Pursuant to the UNFCCC", Apr. 1997, 4) The Secretaries of State for 
the Environment and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "The United Kingdom's Second Report under the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change", Feb. 1997, 5) "UK Energy Paper 68: Energy Projections for UK", Nov. 2000, 
6) WS Atkinsons Environment, "Projections of Non-Co2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions for the UK and Constituent 
Countries Final Report, Nov. 2000, 7) Royaume de Belgique, Deuxieme Communication Nationale Conformement Aux 
Articles 4 Et 12 De La Convention, Aug. 1997, 8) Finland, The Second National Communication of Finland, Apr. 1997.    
 
Table 2：National Cumulative CO2 Emissions of the Past 50 Years: 1949-1998 




Top 50 Countries 
Cumulative CO2 
Emissions 
Share  Population in 
1998 (Millions) 
Per Capita Cumulative 
Emissions (tons) 
WORLD TOTAL WORLD TOTAL WORLD TOTAL WORLD TOTAL 210,802 210,802 210,802 210,802 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 5,838.82 5,838.82 5,838.82 5,838.82 36.1 36.1 36.1 36.1
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 54,488 25.8% 269.09 202.5
 EU  15 37,194 17.6% 374.37  99.4 
2  FORMER SOVIET UNION  32,519 15.4% 291.68  111.5 
3  CHINA *        17,459 8.3%  1238.60  14.1 
4 GERMANY  12,239 5.8% 82.02  149.2 
5 JAPAN  9,163 4.3%  126.49 72.4 
6 UNITED  KINGDOM  7,859 3.7%  59.24  132.7 
7  FRANCE **      4,868 2.3%  58.85  82.7 
8 INDIA  4,830 2.3%  979.67  4.9 
9 CANADA  4,421 2.1% 30.30  145.9 
10 POLAND  4,135 2.0% 38.67  106.9 
11  ITALY ***     3,599 1.7% 56.98  63.2 
12 SOUTH  AFRICA  2,549 1.2% 41.40 61.6 
13 MEXICO  2,333 1.1% 95.68  24.4 
14 AUSTRALIA  2,290 1.1%  18.75  122.1 
15 SPAIN  1,832 0.9% 39.37  46.5 
16 BRAZIL  1,724 0.8%  165.87  10.4 
17  REPUBLIC OF KOREA  1,576 0.7% 46.43  33.9 
18 ROMANIA  1,567 0.7% 22.50  69.6 
19 NETHERLANDS  1,561 0.7%  15.70 99.4 
20  ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN   1,549 0.7% 61.95 25.0 
21  DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA  1,479 0.7% 23.17 63.8 
22 BELGIUM  1,435 0.7%  10.20  140.7 
23 SAUDI  ARABIA  1,293 0.6% 20.74  62.3 
24 VENEZUELA  1,155 0.5% 23.24  49.7 
25 ARGENTINA  1,132 0.5% 36.13 31.3 
26 INDONESIA  1,115 0.5% 203.68  5.5 
27 TURKEY  989 0.5%  64.79  15.3 
28 TAIWAN  848 0.4%  21.87 38.8 
29 HUNGARY  818 0.4%  10.11 80.9 
30 SWEDEN  796 0.4%  8.85  90.0 
31 BULGARIA  715 0.3% 8.26  86.5 
32 DENMARK  653 0.3%  5.30  123.2 
33 THAILAND  628 0.3%  61.20  10.3 
34 AUSTRIA  624 0.3%  8.08  77.2 
35 NIGERIA  576 0.3%  120.82 4.8 
36 EGYPT  569 0.3%  61.40 9.3 
37 ALGERIA  530 0.3%  29.92  17.7 
38 GREECE  514 0.2%  10.51 48.9 
39 FINLAND  489 0.2%  5.15 95.0 
40 COLOMBIA  473 0.2%  40.80  11.6 
41 SWITZERLAND  440 0.2%  7.11 6 1.9 
42 IRAQ  436 0.2%  22.33  19.5 
43 PHILIPPINES  381 0.2% 75.17 5.1 
44 CHILE  326 0.2%  14.82 22.0 
45 NORWAY  3100 . 1% 4.42  70.0 
46 PORTUGAL  302 0.1% 9.98  30.3 
47 CUBA  290 0.1%  11.10 26.1 
48 KUWAIT  288 0.1%  1.87  154.1 
49 IRELAND  284 0.1% 3.71 76.4 
50 ISRAEL  282 0.1% 5.96  47.3 
Data Source : Gregg Marland, Tom Boden (Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee, U.S.A.), Robert J. Andres (University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota, U.S.A.)," National CO2 Emissions from 
Fossil-Fuel Burnings, Cement Manufacture and Gas Flaring : 1751-1998" , July 25, 2001; IEA, "Key World Energy Statistics from the 
IEA 2000 Edition", Nov 2000*Excluding Macao, **Including Monaco, *** Including San Marino               